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ARGUMENT 
I. THIS COURT IS NOT PRECLUDED FROM REVIEWING THE ISSUE 
OF THE AVAILABILITY OF THE CHILD VICTIM TO TESTIFY AT 
TRIAL AS IT WAS ADEQUATELY PRESERVED IN THE TRIAL 
COURT, AND, THE RECORD IS ADEQUATE FOR APPELLATE 
REVIEW. 
A. This issue was preserved for appellate review. 
Defendant objected to the use of the videotaped interview of R.M. at trial. 
Defendant first objected to admission of R.M.'s interview in a motion dated September 
27, 2001 (R. 73-74). In that motion, Defendant stated that the videotape should not be 
admitted "because the child victim's statements [did] not meet the test promulgated by 
Rule 15.5 of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure or Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-411" (R. 
73). 
Rule 15.5 and Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-411 protect a defendant's constitutional 
right to confront a witness against him in a court of law. Defendant objected to the 
admission of the videotape as it violated Rule 15.5 and Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-411. The 
result of allowing the videotape to be seen by the jury in lieu of testimony and an 
opportunity to cross-examine R.M. was a violation of Defendant's constitutional right to 
confrontation. 
Defendant's objection to the admission of the videotaped interview because it did 
not meet the reliability requirements of Rule 15.5 and Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-411 
preserved Defendant's right to raise this issue on appeal. While the constitutional aspect 
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of this issue may not have been specified in the objection at trial, Defendant objected to 
admission of the tape as it did not meet the tests promulgated by the laws of this state, 
resulting in a denial of Defendant's constitutional right to confrontation. See State v. 
Nelson, 725 P.2d 1353, 1352 (Utah 1986). Defendant specifically preserved the issue of 
the trial court's erroneous ruling on the admissibility of the videotaped interview of R.M. 
for appellate review. 
B. The record is complete. 
This Court is not precluded from reviewing the trial court's findings regarding the 
admissibility of the videotaped interview due to insufficiency of the record. The record is 
complete with regard to the admissibility of the videotape. The videotape was first 
entered into evidence at the preliminary hearing on November 8, 2001 (R. 281: 3-4, 6). 
The videotape was also entered into evidence at trial, marked as "State's exhibit number 
1" (R. 283: 69). The videotape was then played for the jury (R. 283: 70). The videotape 
was entered into evidence at the preliminary hearing and was shown to the jury at trial. 
The record on appeal is complete with regard to this issue, and this Court is not precluded 
from reviewing the trial court's erroneous ruling on the admissibility of R.M's out-of-
court statements. 
Even assuming the video is not part of the record on appeal, the transcript of the 
interview adequately demonstrates the unreliability of R.M's statements. Because R.M.'s 
statement were not reliable, the videotaped interview did not fully meet the requirements 
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for admission pursuant to Rule 15.5, Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure. The statements 
made by R.M. during the interview at the Children's Justice Center on September 12, 
2000 were fully transcribed (R. 62). The inaccuracy of her statements and the difficulty 
the interviewers had keeping R.M.'s attention and getting answers to their questions is 
clear from the transcript. It is not necessary for the court to view the videotape to make 
the determination that the interview should not have been viewed in lieu of testimony at 
trial and that Defendant's right to confrontation was infringed by the admission of this 
unreliable evidence. 
Toni Hughes, an expert who testified for the State regarding the availability of 
R.M., based her opinion only on the written transcript and an aural recording of the 
interview (R. 281: 13). She concluded, without viewing the videotape, that while R.M. 
was reliable and consistent in the interview, requiring R.M. to testify at trial would be 
detrimental to her and would not yield such reliable testimony (R. 281: 24-25). This 
conclusion, which was relied upon by the trial court in making its determination, was 
based only on the transcript and aural recording, therefore, with the transcript the record 
is complete and this issue can be reviewed by this Court. 
Finally, all of the necessary transcripts are present in the record on appeal. The 
trial court held a preliminary hearing on November 8, 2001. At the hearing, the State put 
on its expert, Toni Hughes, to testify as to her opinion on the availability of R.M. and 
whether or not she should testify at trial (R. 281: 8-43). Further, the State called Sandy 
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Watson, RJVTs therapist, who testified regarding the reliability of R.M.'s statements, and 
whether R.M. was capable of testifying at trial While additional argument was heard on 
November 19, 2001, a transcript of that hearing is not necessary for this Court to review 
the trial court's ruling. 
It is clear from the transcript of the interview conducted on September 12, 2000 
that R.M.'s statements were not reliable and that the finding that she was unavailable was 
erroneous. Furthermore, the trial court issued a seven page ruling on the admissibility of 
the videotape at trial, which is included in the record, and can be reviewed by this court. 
The record is complete and this Court is not precluded from reviewing the trial court's 
ruling on this issue. 
II THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN RULING THAT R.M WAS 
UNAVAILABLE TO TESTIFY IN ANY CAPACITY AT TRIAL AND 
THAT THE STATEMENTS MADE BY R.M. IN THE VIDEOTAPED 
INTERVIEW WERE SUFFICIENTLY RELIABLE TO BE ADMITTED 
INTO EVIDENCE. 
A R.M. made numerous inconsistent statements undermining her 
reliability. 
R.M. made numerous inconsistent statements during her interview at the 
Children's Justice Center on September 12, 2000. See Aplt. Br. at 18-20. The State 
argues that these M[m]inor inconsistent statements do not render [R.M.]'s statement 
unreliable" Aple. Br. at 20. R.M. made numerous inconsistent and improbable statements 
during the interview which exhibited an overall confusion of the facts and undermined 
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R.M.'s ability to accurately recall and report instances of alleged sexual abuse. See Aplt. 
Br. at 18-20. When reviewed individually, the inconsistencies may appear minor, but 
when considered in the aggregate, they demonstrate R.M.'s overall inability to articulate 
events. Further, the inconsistencies raise legitimate questions as to the reliability of her 
assertions. 
B Corroborative Evidence 
The State correctly asserts that the lack of corroborating evidence is irrelevant to a 
determination of reliability of a child victim's out-of-court statements pursuant to Utah 
Code Ann. § 76-5-411. Aple. Br. at 22-23. The Utah Supreme Court in State v. 
Masamas. 808 P.2d 1048, 1054 (Utah 1991) explains that "the presence of evidence 
tending to corroborate the truth of the matter asserted un hearsay statements of an alleged 
child victim can never be considered by a court in making the interest of justice' 
reliability determination.,f 
The trial court in its ruling on the admissibility of the videotape noted the 
testimony of Hughes that R.M. exhibited behavior "consistent with those of a child who 
had been sexually abused," and that the statements to "Officer Sessions . . . , to her 
mother, and to Ms. Watson, were consistent although they tended to be more expansive 
over time" (R. 187). The trial court then concluded, "These factors provide corroboration 
to the statements made by the child" (R. 187). The trial court clearly erred in relying on 
the presence of corroborative evidence in ruling that the videotape was admissible. 
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In his brief, Defendant argued that there were numerous inconsistencies in 
statements made by R.M. which raised doubt of the reliability of the statements. Aplt. Br. 
at 17. It was noted that there was no other reliable evidence supporting the questionable 
allegations of R.M. This argument is not precluded as it is simply pointing out the 
illegality of the trial court's ruling partially founded on the improper basis of 
corroboration (R. 187). 
C The interview was not reliable and should not have been 
admitted into evidence at trial. 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-411(2) "requires a determination of reliability without 
regard to whether the hearsay declarant is available. The importance of such an inquiry 
cannot be overemphasized." State v. Nelson, 725 P.2d 1353, 1356 (Utah 1986). The trial 
court erred in it determination that the out-of-court statements made by R.M. in the 
videotaped interview were reliable and therefore that the videotape was admissible as 
evidence. 
Defendant has sufficiently demonstrated the unreliable nature of the videotaped 
interview, including the methods used in questioning of R.M. and her demeanor and 
responses to the interviewers questions. Aplt. Br. at 16-20. Many of the statements were 
inconsistent. Aplt. Br. at 17-18. The interviewers were leading. Aplt. Br. at 19. R.M. 
had discussed her allegations of abuse several times, with several different people prior to 
the videotaped interview at the Children's Justice Center and showed signs that her 
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statements were a result of suggestion. Aplt. Br. at 19-20. R.M. was only four at the time 
of the disclosures, and in the interview, demonstrated the immaturity and unreliability of 
a four year old. R.M. was not able to articulate, in a consistent or cohesive manner, the 
alleged abuse perpetrated by Defendant. 
The trial court did not adequately consider the entirety of this evidence when 
making his determination on the availability of R.M. to testify at trial, and the 
admissibility of the videotaped interview. The court did not make adequate findings in 
his ruling on the admissibility of the tape. In State v. Matsamas. 808 P.2d 1048, 1051 
(Utah 1991), the court stated, "The trial court should [] enter findings and conclusions 
regarding each of the factors listed in the statute to explain its reasons for admitting or 
excluding the testimony." It is Defendant's contention that the statutory factors were not 
adequately considered. 
The court incorrectly states that R.M. had not been interviewed by anyone else 
prior to her interview at the Children's Justice Center when in fact, R.M. had already 
spoken with her mother and with Sandy Watson regarding her allegations (R. 188, 283: 
55, 57, 116-117). Additionally, the court glosses over the additional findings and does 
not provide examples or any reasoning for his determination that the statements were 
reliable (R. 184-190). 
The videotape was unreliable and should not have been admitted into evidence. 
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Ill THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ADMITTING HEARSAY TESTIMONY 
AT TRIAL AND SHOULD NOT HAVE ALLOWED WITNESSES TO 
REPEAT THE OUT-OF-COURT STATEMENTS MADE BY R.M. 
A Tracie McEwen 
The State claims that the issue of the admission of R.M.'s out-of-court statements 
to her mother, Tracie McEwen (ffMcEwenfl) was inadequately briefed, therefore, it should 
be rejected. Defendant adequately briefed this issue citing Rule 801, Utah Rules of 
Evidence, Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-411, and several cases regarding the reliability of 
hearsay statements. As argued in Defendant's brief, the testimony of McEwen was 
hearsay. Hearsay is generally not admissible as it lacks trustworthiness. See State v. 
Sibert 6 Utah 2d 198, 310 P.2d 388 (1957). Defendant briefs the issue of the 
admissibility and reliability of McEwen's hearsay testimony and cites legal authority in 
support of his argument. 
The State also argues that there was sufficient corroborative evidence at trial to 
support the admission of the out-of-court statements made by R.M. to McEwen. The 
State claims that the videotaped interview, the testimony of Sandy Watson that R.M. 
exhibited sexualized behavior and the testimony of Toni Hughes that R.M.'s behavior 
was consistent with sexual abuse, were adequately corroborative to permit McEwen to 
testify as to R.M.'s out-of-court statements. Aple. Br. at 23. This alleged corroborative 
evidence was also insufficiently reliable. Much of the testimony of Watson and Hughes, 
and the basis for their opinions, were hearsay and are therefore were not corroborative. 
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B. Sandy Watson 
The State cites State v. Pecht 2002 UT 41, f 23, 48 P.3d 931 in support of its 
argument that the trial court did not err in its ruling on the admissibility of the out-of-
court statements of R.M. as repeated by Sandy Watson, R.M.'s counselor. The facts and 
circumstances in Pecht are not analogous to the case at bar. 
The State first claims that the trial court did not err by admitting the statements 
even though they were made several months after the abuse occurred. In Pecht, the trial 
court did admit statements that were made over year after the alleged abuse occurred, and 
that there was "no indication that the passage of time had any material effect on the 
reliability of the statements." Id. The ages of the alleged victims in Pecht are not 
provided in the opinion, but based on the fact that the children were alive at the time of 
the separation of the defendant and his wife in 1988, the children were at least nine at the 
time of the abuse, and eleven at the time of the disclosure. The court twice noted that the 
reliability determination was based on the age, responsiveness and maturity of the 
children. Id. at fflj 7, 9. 
In the present case, the alleged victim, R.M. was only four years old at the time of 
the abuse. Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-411 specifically states that "the age and maturity of 
the child" should be considered when making the determination of whether to allow the 
out-of-court statements into evidence. Here, the age and maturity of R.M. were such that 
the validity of the statements made several months after the abuse is questionable as she 
9 
was very young and immature and the statements were made during a traumatic period of 
her life wherein she was questioned by several individuals regarding the alleged abuse. 
The trial court did not sufficiently consider the lengthy time delay between the alleged 
abuse and the disclosures by R.M. to Sandy Watson, and how that affected the reliability 
of the out-of-court statements. 
Pecht also differs from the current case in that the child victims actually testified at 
trial, giving jurors an opportunity to evaluate their demeanor and the reliability of their 
testimony. Pecht, 2002 UT 41, ^|12. Here, the only source of information regarding the 
alleged abuse was the videotaped interview and the hearsay statements. The trial court 
erred in admitting the hearsay statements of Watson and McEwen when the reliability of 
the statements were in question, and there was no other corroborating evidence of the 
abuse other than the statements of a four year old several months after the alleged abuse 
occurred. 
The State points out that there is no Utah case law requiring that the out-of-court 
statements be produced to the jury verbatim. While it may not be necessary that the 
statements be word-for-word, the fact that these statements were not simultaneously 
recorded is one additional factor to consider when determining the reliability of the 
hearsay testimony. Even if the statements were recorded immediately following 
Watson's sessions with R.M., there was still potential for inaccuracy in the recording and 
transcribing of R.M.'s statements. 
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The trial court erred by admitting R.M.'s out-of-court statements to Watson into 
evidence at trial. 
C. Toni Hughes 
The State alleges that Defendant did not preserve the issue of Hughes hearsay 
testimony repeating statements made to her by R.M. more than one year after the alleged 
abuse. The State did in fact object at trial, thereby preserving this issue for appellate 
review. At trial, the prosecutor asked Hughes if R.M. disclosed any "conduct relating to 
alleged sexual abuse1' (R. 283: 156). Defendant immediately objected on the basis of 
hearsay (R. 283: 156) which was sustained insofar as the truthfulness of the statements 
made by R.M. (R. 283: 157). The trial court permitted Hughes to repeat the statements of 
R.M. and cautioned the jury to consider those only as they bore on the opinion reached by 
Hughes (R. 283: 157). Defendant again objected on the on the basis of hearsay a few 
minutes later when Hughes was again asked what R.M. related to her in the course of her 
evaluation (R. 238: 159). Again, the jury was cautioned to consider the testimony for the 
limited purpose as previously explained (R. 238:159). 
Hughes was ultimately permitted to repeat statements made to her by R.M. during 
her evaluation (R. 238: 159-160). Even though the jury was cautioned to not consider 
these statements for the truth of the matter asserted, the repeated hearsay statements of 
R.M as testified by Hughes at trial served to bolster the credibility of the other hearsay 
testimony heard at trial. 
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Hughes' testimony did not qualify as an exception to the hearsay rule under Rule 
803(4), Utah Rules of Evidence which permits testimony regarding statements made for 
the purpose of a medical diagnosis. 
Hughes is not a medical doctor, nor is she qualified to make a medical or 
psychological diagnosis. The State does not cite any case law from this jurisdiction, but 
cites an 8th Circuit case and a North Carolina state case to support its contention that this 
exception extends to social workers and therapists, therefore including individuals with 
Hughes' training in the exception (Aple. Br. at 40; United States v. Balfanv, 965 F.2d 575 
(8th Cir. 1992); State v. Standi, 552 S.E.2d 212 (N.C. App. 2001)). In Standi, the court 
describes a two-prong test for testimony under North Carolina's analogous rule: "First, 
the trial court must determine whether the declarant intended to make the statements to 
obtain medical diagnosis or treatment. Second, the trial court must determine whether the 
declarant's statements were reasonably pertinent to medical diagnosis or treatment.'1 Id- at 
217). 
Here, it is likely that R.M. was not cognitively making these statements to obtain a 
medical diagnosis or treatment, therefore lacking the necessary indicia of reliability. The 
statements made by R.M. to Hughes do not qualify as admissible hearsay under the 
exception that permits hearsay statements for the purpose of medical diagnosis pursuant 
to Rule 803(4), Utah Rules of Evidence. 
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CONCLUSION 
Based on the Defendant's appellate brief and the foregoing, Defendant's 
conviction should be reversed. 
DATED this 7 ( day of March, 2003. 
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